Beneath the genocidal, expansionist madness of Israel’s bloodlust lies some cold, hard logic. The lands of Lebanon and the Occupied Palestinian Territories bear riches, and Israel covets them.
It wasn’t so long ago that Israel was entirely reliant on importing its energy from abroad. But the discovery of significant fossil gas fields off the country’s coastline in 2009 and 2010 sparked a dizzying transition. Within the space of a decade or so, Israel became, not only energy independent, but an energy exporter, sending excess gas extracted from its fields to Egypt and Jordan, while grander ambitions soon became apparent, too.
After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, leaders in the European Union scrambled to break the bloc’s reliance on Russian gas. The E.U. turned to, among other sources, countries like Azerbaijan, which, around that time was beginning to ramp up its now completed ethnic cleansing of Armenians from the Nagorno-Karabakh region, and Israel, an apartheid state and illegal occupying force in Palestine. By June 2022, the E.U. had signed an agreement with Israel and Egypt, which essentially laid the groundwork for Israeli gas to be exported to Europe in future.
Israel extracts gas from a range of fields that fall within its legally defined maritime borders, and it intends to expand its operations at these sites. But it is not the only player in the region: its enemies, too, lay claim to some of the gas fields of the Eastern Mediterranean.
In 1999 a natural gas field, the Gaza Marine, was discovered off the coast of the Gaza Strip, situated in Palestinian territory as it is defined under the terms of the Oslo Agreement. There was hope, around that time, that the gas supplies found there, though relatively modest, would nonetheless be sufficient to power the Palestinian Territories and to even leave enough left over for export. The potential benefits to the severely underdeveloped Palestinian economy were huge.
But, over the following quarter of a century, development of the Gaza Marine stalled. Israel, while posturing as a potential partner in the project, consistently stood in the way of progress, citing, among other things, concerns that the revenues generated from the gas field would find their way into the hands of Hamas, which took control of Gaza in 2007. It also insisted that extracted gas be refined on Israeli territory, which would, in effect, have granted it control over the whole operation.
The Gaza Marine project, then, remained locked in limbo, preventing billions of dollars of potential revenue from ever being generated for the Palestinians.
In June 2023, a deal appeared to have been struck at last. Israel, for reasons which aren’t entirely clear, agreed to allow the Gaza Marine to be developed, a move depicted by many foreign policy wonks at the time as a “win-win” for both sides. But the optimism was short-lived, as, following Hamas’ October 7 massacre and Israel’s genocidal response, any hope that a project to benefit the Palestinians might come to fruition was obliterated. As if to underline this point, Israel, just weeks after the war started, announced it was issuing licenses to allow both Israeli and foreign companies to search for gas in the Eastern Mediterranean. Some of the zones it approved for exploration reportedly fell within the legally defined maritime borders of Gaza, which means it was allowing the plunder of Palestinian land for its own, and foreign, enrichment.
Beneath the hostilities between Israel and Lebanon, too, lies gas. Beginning in 2010, the two countries became locked in a dispute over a pair of gas fields off their respective shores: the northern Qana field and the southern Karish field. Development of the former would have been hugely beneficial to the Lebanese economy, but friction with Israel over who had rights over certain sections meant no progress was made for about 12 years.
The situation appeared to reach a resolution in 2022, when the two sides signed a deal overseen by the United States. Israel emerged with full control over the Karish field, while it would also take a cut of the profits generated from Lebanon’s Qana field. Even though it was going to be giving up a share of its profits from Qana — reported to be 17% — Lebanon could at last look forward to exploiting the field and generating some much-needed revenue for the country’s dire economy.
The deal, as with the Gaza Marine agreement, was presented as a sort of win-win, but, as Israel has expanded its war into Lebanon, Israeli officials have begun openly searching for “loopholes” to justify breaking it. The agreement, as the situation in the region deteriorates, looks to be as good as dead, as is any hope that Lebanon may tap into its energy resources to help boost its economy any time soon.
Should Israel succeed in its military aims in Gaza and Lebanon, it is conceivable that it will redraw borders and claim energy resources that presently belong to its neighbors. It would then have a greater pool of gas to tap into and export, which would come with obvious financial benefits. But the Lebanese and Gazan gas fields are hardly the most significant in size, dwarfed even by Israel’s existing fields. The primary benefit of taking control of them, then, would arguably not be to extract wealth from them, but to prevent the Palestinians and the Lebanese from doing so. It would ensure their continued weakness and underdevelopment.
There are multiple reasons for Israel’s criminal aggression towards Palestine and Lebanon. Whether or not gas is a primary concern for Israeli leaders is unclear, but it is surely a factor. When the wars are over, whenever that may be, Israel may emerge more gas-rich than when it entered them. Its enemies, conversely, will be all the poorer.